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Introduction
In many liberalization or privatization projects, governments eventually face the issue how to select firms that will provide the formerly publicly provided service. One of the advantages of using auctions as a selection mechanism, so it is often thought, is that auctions select the most cost-efficient firms. Markets where more cost-efficient firms are active typically yield more efficient market outcomes than when these same markets are served by less cost-efficient firms, i.e., other things being equal cost-efficiency is good for overall economic welfare. One forceful statement of this view is by Demsetz (1968) . Demsetz argues that competition for the market may be a good substitute for competition in the market. Moreover, in a monopoly context he argues that the most cost-efficient firm will win the competition for the market (read: will win the auction).
In this paper, we will refer to this result as the monopoly result of Demsetz. This result has permeated a large literature on procurement issues and, indeed, Laffont and Tirole (2002, pp. 307-8) state that if one ignores the processing, capture and dynamic costs of auctions, it is easy to see that auctions typically select the firm with the lowest cost.
Recently, many governments have relied on a combination of competition for and competition in the market. An important case in point is the wave of 3G mobile telephony spectrum auctions that have been held around the world (see, e.g., Klemperer 2002a , 2002b , Binmore and Klemperer 2002 , and Jehiel and Moldovanu 2004 . In all of the 3G auctions, multiple licenses were sold and as there were more firms participating in the auction than available licenses, firms had to compete to obtain a license. Many governments formally or informally stated that efficient assignment of frequency spectrum was one of the goals to be achieved. With cost asymmetries between firms, efficient assignment implies that the most cost-efficient firms should win licenses, and indeed the Dutch government, among others, mentioned selecting the most efficient firms as one of the reasons for holding an auction (see, e.g., Janssen et al. 2001) .
In this paper, we will argue however that the monopoly result of Demsetz does not carry over to the case of multiple licenses, i.e., to the case where firms compete in an oligopolistic fashion in the aftermarket. In particular, there are market conditions under which the most cost-efficient firms will not necessarily obtain the licenses, or even worse, that the least cost-efficient firms will necessarily secure them. The main reason that the Demsetz result does not generalize is that in an auction with multiple licenses, a strategic effect works against the Demsetz result. Basically, the strategic effect is present in almost all market settings as it simply confirms the fact that any firm prefers to compete with high-cost firms rather than with low-cost firms. Depending on the market conditions and the ex-ante distribution of firms' costs, the strategic effect can be so strong that the most cost-efficient firms make less profit in the aftermarket when they compete with each other than the least cost-efficient firms do.
More technically, we consider a standard multi-unit uniform-price auction where firms have private information about their costs, and overall economic efficiency requires the most efficient firms to win the auction. A strategy for the firms is a function specifying how a firm's bid depends on its efficiency parameter. The generalization of the Demsetz monopoly result to the case where multiple licenses are auctioned requires that the more efficient a firm is, the higher it bids in the auction, i.e., there should exist a monotone symmetric bidding equilibrium where firms' bidding strategy is increasing in their efficiency parameter. We identify conditions under which such a symmetric increasing bidding equilibrium exists and when it does not exit.
A first, more easily identifiable condition under which a symmetric increasing bidding equilibrium fails to exist is that firms' efficiency parameters are positively correlated (affiliated) so that learning one's own efficiency parameter provides information about other firms' private information. In practice, positive affiliation of firms' efficiency parameters may naturally arise in sectors where firms use similar production technologies and prices of inputs fluctuate with (macroeconomic) shocks that are common to all firms. Alternatively, firms may implement cost-saving technologies that arise from an exogenous stochastic process. In both cases, if a firm is more cost-efficient itself, it infers that all other firms are more cost-efficient as well.
Therefore, more efficient firms expect to be competing with other efficient firms (who are known to be fierce competitors) and thus expect to make less profit in the aftermarket than less efficient firms. 2 We will show, that for any oligopolistic market, no matter how weak the strategic effect is, there are distributions of firms' types for which a symmetric increasing bidding equilibrium does not exist.
A second, more surprising condition under which a symmetric increasing bidding equilibrium fails to exist is where firms' efficiency parameters are ex-ante independent.
Despite firms' types being ex-ante independent, the types of firms that win licenses will be correlated. This is so because all winning firms outbid the firm with the highest loosing bid. As this ex post form of positive correlation (affiliation) actually is the only correlation that is relevant for determining the optimal bidding strategy, the intuitive reason for the nonexistence of a symmetric increasing bidding equilibrium is then the same as above. We will show that in this case of statistically independent types an increasing equilibrium fails to exist only if the strategic effect is sufficiently strong.
When one of these two conditions holds, a symmetric increasing bidding equilibrium does not exist. This implies that only (i) asymmetric equilibria exist in which different firms have different bidding functions, or (ii) the equilibrium bidding functions are not monotone, or (iii) firms use random bidding strategies, or (iv) a decreasing equilibrium exists. In all of these four cases, there is at least a positive probability that less efficient firms will bid more than more efficient firms and therefore obtain the licenses. Thus, if firms' types are highly correlated, or the strategic effect is strong enough, the overall outcome is inefficient with positive probability.
3
We also show, by means of an example, that if firms' types are correlated and the strategic effect is strong enough, a unique monotone symmetric bidding equilibrium is decreasing. In this case, auctions always select the least efficient firms implying lower overall welfare than any other selection mechanism.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the two-stage model with an auction stage and a market competition stage. In Section 3 we then provide necessary and sufficient conditions for an increasing equilibrium to exist and illustrate what these general conditions imply in case of Bertrand and Cournot competition in the aftermarket. Then, in section 4, we provide an example in which a unique monotone symmetric bidding equilibrium exists and that it is decreasing.
Section 5 concludes and provides a discussion of related literature and remaining issues.
The appendix contains all proofs.
3 There are now many papers studying inefficiencies created by auctions due to aftermarket competition. For a recent overview, see Jehiel and Moldovanu (2006) . Hoppe, Jehiel and Moldovanu (2006) focus on the interaction between incumbents and entrants, Janssen (2006) considers how auctions may lead to coordination in the market stage and Janssen and Karamychev (2006) study selection effects in markets where demand uncertainty is important. and Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1996) show that even when one license is auctioned, inefficiencies may arise due to the existence of externalities between the bidders.
The Model
Access to the aftermarket is limited to the firms that have obtained licenses to operate in the market. The government allocates licenses in a multi-unit auction to the highest bidding firms, and we assume that firms participate in the auction.
In the oligopolistic aftermarket, firms compete by simultaneously choosing a value of the strategic variable s. Depending on the market, we can interpret s as either a price p or a quantity q, or any other relevant strategic variable. The profit π i of firm i is determined by the level of s that firm i and the other (n -1) firms choose, and by the firm's efficiency parameter e i . As we assume that π i is symmetric in all s j for
can be written as ( )
where s -i is a vector of strategic variables chosen by all other firms. To shorten notation, we denote the partial derivatives of π as follows:
The efficiency parameter e i positively influences the profit of firm i by reducing its total as well as marginal costs. Therefore, for a typical cost function f(e, q) of a firm we will have: In order to ensure the existence, uniqueness and stability of the Nash equilibrium in the aftermarket, firms' marginal profit function must satisfy a stability requirement. We follow Bulow et al. (1985) and assume in the case of strategic complements, where
and in case of strategic substitutes, where
We analyze the case where the government organizes a multi-unit uniform-price auction to allocate the n licenses, where all the winning firms pay the same license fee w, which is equal to the highest non-winning bid. This uniform-price auction allows us to simplify the exposition of results while keeping the formulation of the aftermarket competition stage quite general. In the main body of the paper we assume that resale of licenses is not allowed. In the final section, we discuss how allowing for different auction formats and resale of licenses after the auction will affect our results. In what follows, we mainly focus on the private information scenario. The imperfect information scenario is too complicated to analyze as signaling issues significantly complicate firms' bidding behavior. As each firm has an incentive to pretend to be more efficient than it actually is, the auction stage would have to be analyzed as an N firm signaling game with each player being a sender and a potential receiver of signals.
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The full information scenario, on the other hand, does not seem to be realistic.
Moreover, this scenario can be analyzed in a similar way to the private information scenario, as we will briefly indicate in footnote 5 below.
In the private information scenario, a type e i paying a license fee w and choosing s i in the aftermarket has an expected market profit conditional on winning the auction of 4 Goeree (2003) contains an analysis of how single-agent signaling affects bidding behavior in auctions. 
When an increasing bidding equilibrium does not exist
We are now ready to analyze the necessary and sufficient conditions for an increasing symmetric bidding equilibrium to exist. We first derive these conditions for the general case described in the previous section. Then we analyze two sets of circumstances (firms' types being independently distributed, and affiliated types) under which the necessary conditions cannot be satisfied so that the auction stage does not have an increasing symmetric bidding equilibrium. With independent types, we also indicate what these conditions imply in case of Bertrand and Cournot competition.
Let b (+) (e) be an increasing symmetric equilibrium bidding function and be the corresponding firms' aftermarket Nash equilibrium strategy.
Denoting a firm's reduced-form profit by
, ,
allows us to write the expected profit of type x conditional on getting a license as
is a firm's valuation function, which is used in the auction stage to determine the optimal bidding strategy. The following proposition derives an equilibrium bidding function and necessary and sufficient conditions for an increasing symmetric bidding equilibrium to exist. The statements made in Proposition 1 can be understood as follows. Suppose that x = z.
In other words, suppose that firm i and another firm, let us say firm m, have the same type, i.e., , so that they together determine the auction price w, and e k >z for all other winning firms k. In this case, firms i and m compete for only one remaining license. They will bid their entire expected market profits v 
Statistically independent type
Using Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 as a general tool, we now first analyze the case where firms' types are independent. Let the firms' efficiency parameters e i be identically and independently distributed over a compact and bounded support in accordance with an arbitrary twice differentiable distribution function , which density is denoted by . The following proposition states a condition under which an increasing equilibrium fails to exist.
( ) 
Proposition 2 tells us that a sufficient condition for a symmetric increasing bidding equilibrium not to exist can be obtained by investigating the partial derivatives of
the profit function at this point. One can easily calculate them to be: 
Affiliated types
In the examples above, we have shown that if the strategic effect is stronger than the direct effect then for any independent prior distribution of firms' types, an increasing equilibrium does not exist. It turns out that that even if the strategic effect is weak (but still exists) an increasing equilibrium may still fail to exist provided firms' types are exante affiliated. where ε > 0 is small, it expects to compete with firms which types are distributed over [1 -ε, 1], in which case:
If, on the other hand, the type of firm i is marginally above 1, i.e.,
, the firm expects to compete with firms which types are distributed over [1 + ε, 2], in which case:
It is easy to see that the bidding function is discontinuous and actually decreases at 1:
Hence, a symmetric increasing bidding equilibrium fails to exist no matter how weak the strategic effect is.
On decreasing bidding equilibria
The analysis in the previous section leads us to a natural question, namely whether there exist market structures and types' distributions, for which not only an increasing equilibrium fails to exist, but instead a symmetric decreasing equilibrium does exist. In such an equilibrium, the least-efficient firms always submit the highest bids and obtain the licenses to compete in the aftermarket. In this section, we first argue that the strategic effect and ex-ante affiliation of firms' types are both necessary for a decreasing equilibrium to exist. Next, we provide an example of specific market conditions under which a decreasing equilibrium exists.
When a monotone symmetric equilibrium bidding function is a decreasing function, firm's valuation function v (-) (x, z) must be defined as follows 
The reason why we consider this specific distribution is that for small values of ε, if a firm i has a type x, the distribution of types of all other firms conditional on x is concentrated on a small neighborhood of x. Therefore, all firms that are competing in the aftermarket have approximately the same type, the Nash equilibrium is almost symmetric, and a decreasing equilibrium bidding function can be analytically calculated in the limit when ε converges to zero. Figure 1 In the example considered in Proposition 4, the demand elasticity r must not be too small (r > 1/n) in order to ensure that the aftermarket Nash equilibrium exists and is stable. On the other hand, r must be small enough ( ( ) n r r < ) so that the strategic effect is sufficiently strong. The minimum number of licenses for this decreasing equilibrium to exists is n = 3. The main reason is that the strategic effect should be strong enough and this effect gets stronger, the larger the number of firms competing in the market place. 
Discussion and Conclusion
In this article, we have shown that when multiple licenses are auctioned to firms which compete in an aftermarket, these licenses do not have to end up in the hands of the most efficient firms. This implies that auctions may create aftermarket inefficiencies. The main reasons for this result are the presence of an informational externality and the fact that rational bidders take a kind of adverse selection or winner's curse into account. Jehiel and Moldovanu (2006) argue that in case firms' aftermarket profits depend on private information in the hands of other winning firms (in our case cost) there is an informational externality. The kind of adverse selection or winner's curse that is present in our context is that firms prefer to compete with less efficient firms and that when the auction selects the most efficient firms, bidding firms have to take this selection effect into account. We have identified conditions under which efficient firms downsize their bid so much more than less efficient firms that an increasing bidding equilibrium does not exist.
The model developed in this paper does not fit into the now standard assumptions of the affiliated valuation model (Milgrom and Weber, 1982 ). An important assumption in the affiliated valuation model is that a player's valuation is an increasing function of his own signal as well as of the private signals received by all other players. In our case, where firms receive a signal of their cost parameter, firms' valuation is an increasing function of its own signal, but a decreasing function of the signals of other firms. Moreover, but less important, a firm only cares about the signals received by other winning firms.
In this paper, we have focused our attention only on a standard multi-unit uniformprice auction. It can be shown, however, that other simultaneous-bid multi-unit auctions, e.g., a pay-your-bid auction, also suffer from aftermarket inefficiency provided the strategic effect or the ex-ante types' correlation is sufficiently strong.
Firms' desire to compete with less efficient competitors is responsible for such inefficiency. The analysis is much more complicated in case of sequential auctions, where licenses are sold one-by-one. It is easy to see that the last license ends up in hands of the most efficient remaining firm. Nevertheless, the strategic effect might create inefficient allocations in selling preceding licenses.
We have not allowed for resale in this paper. Resale opens up the possibility that in case of an inefficient allocation of licenses, an efficient firm buys a license from a less efficient firm. Such a single transaction would also be mutually beneficial because for given competitors' efficiency levels, an efficient firm makes more profits than a less efficient firm does. However, it is much less clear whether such a transaction is feasible in case other firms are also allowed to transact so that a sequential resale market would emerge. Analyzing the model while allowing for reselling turns out to be quite complicated. Apart from the fact that reselling is sometimes not allowed or prohibitively costly, there is another good reason not to consider the possibility of reselling. For example, in case a decreasing equilibrium exists, n most efficient firms together make less profit than n least efficient firms do. If, together with reselling, we allow firms to make side payments to other firms for not selling their licenses, one can show that the license holders (together) can "outbid" an offer of a more efficient firm as the profits they would loose when this new firm competes in the market are larger than the profit the newcomer could make. Hence, a decreasing bidding equilibrium yields an ex-post efficient allocation from the perspective of the coalition of winning firms. This paper does not consider the question whether an optimal mechanism exist in the present situation. This is an interesting, but non-trivial, question. What is clear, however, is that the results obtained by Ausubel (2004) Proof of Proposition 1. Let us define Z to be the type of the firm that submits the n th highest bid amongst all (N -1) firms other than firm i, i.e., Z is the n th highest order statistics among e j , j ≠ i. We denote the distribution of Z conditional on e i = x by
, and the corresponding density function by
Suppose that all firms other than i follow the bidding function b (+) (e), and Z takes a value z. We consider a firm i, which has a cost parameter e i = x and which bids b
If y < z, firm i looses the auction and receives no profit. If, on the other hand, y > z, firm i gets a license at the auction price , which yields the conditional expected profit t o f i r m i. The unconditional expected profit of a firm with cost parameter x and a bid b
.
Maximizing with respect to y yields the first-order condition , i.e., . The necessary second-order condition in this case can be written as . Finally, is an increasing function only if .
( y
Suppose now that and . In order to check that is indeed an optimal bid, we evaluate for any y ≠ x:
This shows that firm i has no profitable deviations. ■ Proof of Lemma 1. If a firm i gets a license, has a type e i = x, and chooses s i , whereas all its competitors have the same type z, the market profit of firm i can be written as follows:
Maximizing this expression with respect to s i yields the following first-order condition:
Differentiating it with respect to x and z, taking into account that firm i is of type x and all other firms are of type z and choose , and evaluating the resulting expression at z = x yields: the first-order condition implies the following two equations determining and : From now on we denote by x a type of a firm i. Types of all other (winning and loosing) firms are e j , (e k and e l = z respectively), and we define
so that for any :
Thus, for given x, conditional distribution ( ) (
], and conditional distribution ( ) ( 
itself and its partial derivatives evaluated at as , where we defined functions
Properties of are derived in the following lemma, which is proven after the proof of the proposition.
Let e i be distributed in accordance with the distribution function F * . Then, for small ε can be written as follows:
Using Lemma 2, we rewrite as follows: Plugging this expression into the first-order condition yields: In order show that an increasing symmetric bidding equilibrium does not exist for small ε, we calculate firms' valuation function , and verify that for given parameters' restrictions, . Using the first-order approximation for and feasible z. Therefore, the proposed function is indeed decreasing and is a unique symmetric equilibrium bidding function. 
